Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 71
Issue 3 Fall

Article 1

Fall 1980

Victimless Justice
Abner J. Mikva

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Abner J. Mikva, Victimless Justice, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 189 (1980)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/80/7103-0189502.00/0
Vol. 71, No. 3
Printedin U.S.A.

THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGy

Copyright 0 1980 by Northwestern University School of Law

CRIMINAL LAW
VICTIMLESS JUSTICE
ABNER J. MIKVA

The author was appointed to the United States Court of Appealsfor the Districtof Columbia Circuit
in 1979.
Judge Mikva was elected to five terms in the United States House of Representatives, representing
portions of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. As a freshman Congressman, he was appointed to the
Brown Commission which provided the main impetus for current congressional efforts to recodify the
criminal laws of the United States. Judge Mikva served on both the Judiciary and Ways and Means
Committees during his tenure in the Congress. He was a member of five subcommittees, three under the
Judiciary Committee-CriminalJustice; Administrative Law and Governmental Relations; and Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice-and two at Ways and Means-Trade and Social
Security. In the 95th Congress, he was Chairmanof the Democratic Study Group which was comprisedof
over 250 House Democrats seeking political reform.
Judge Mikva served as a navigator in the Army Air Corps in World War II. He received his law
degreefrom the University of Chicago in 1951, graduatingcum laude. He was editor-in-chiefof the Law
Review and a member of the Orderof the Coif He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Followinggraduation,
he was selectedas a law clerk to U.S. Supreme CourtJusticeSherman Minton. After ayearin Washington,
D.C., he returnedto Illinois where he practiced law and became a law partner ofJustice Arthur Goldberg.
In 1956, Judge Mikva won a seat in the Illinois House of Representatives-thefirst of five
consecutive terms (1956-66). While there, he served as Chairman of the Illinois House Judiciary
Committee.
While he was out of the U.S. Congress for one term, (1972-74), Judge Mikva returned to an
extensive commercial law practice, engaging in trial and appellate litigation. Also during this period,he
served as Chairman of the Illinois Ethics Board, and taught courses at Northwestern University School of
Law.
Judge Mikva has authoredseveral law review articleson subjects rangingfrom sovereign immunity to
the legislative process.
As a member of the American Bar Association, Judge Mikva was on the Governing Council's Section
on Individual Rights and Responsibilities as well as the Section on Litigation.
This article is based upon a Commencement address which Judge Mikva delivered at Northwestern
University School of Law, May 18, 1980.
I believe it was Langston Hughes who said,
"Don't prate to me about the glory of your institutions. Tell me how they work for me." If all of
you lawyers in the audience, new and old, can
extricate yourselves just for the moment from the
institutions which you serve or are about to serve
and take an objective look at one of them from the
eyes of the citizenry, you will find that the criminal
justice system does not work very well.
When we first came out of our caves many
centuries ago, we banded together in loose govern-

mental forms in order to protect ourselves from the
four-legged animals that preyed on us. As time
went on and the number and forms of government
increased, the number of legs on the animals decreased. By the time we formed this country, we
were able to describe the desire for protection
against our fellow man in a Constitution: to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, [and]
provide for the common defence." The current
perception of the average citizen is that we do not
do any of those things very well, and perhaps the
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gap between perception and fact is not a wide one.
The statistics are striking. For every ten crimes
committed, it is estimated that only three or four
are reported. That figure reflects the pervading
cynicism about the system's capacity to insure
justice. Equally dismal is the fact that over 5,000
crimes are reported annually per 100,000 persons,
a number which has increased from a level of about
3,700 crimes per 100,000 persons only a decade
ago. Considering this rate of reported crimes, the
odds that any one of us will be a crime victim in a
year's time are better than one out of twenty.
Unreported crimes increase these odds to about
one out of seven. The really discouraging numbers
relate to what happens after a crime is reported.
Police estimate that their arrests solve only onefifth of the crimes reported to them. Moreover, a
great many of the defendants are not convicted.
For instance, a few years ago in Chicago, only
twenty-six percent of those persons arrested on a
felony charge were convicted. These statistics present a grim picture when aggregated. Only about
one out of every one hundred crimes is successfully
processed through the criminal justice system.
The anger and dismay of the average citizen are
understandable. He observes obviously guilty defendants released for what seem to be the most
trivial reasons: the failure of the police to say
particular words when arresting the defendant, the
prosecutor's mistake during the trial, ajuror's reading of a prejudicial article. Further, the monstrously malfunctioning prison system hardens prisoners and thus compounds rather than corrects the
problems. Parole boards exacerbate this assembly
line justice by guessing wrong sometimes and releasing those who will commit more crimes.
From a different perspective, the defendant who
is ultimately convicted may suffer draconian punishment. We hear accolades for a Dallas judge who
meted out 800-year sentences for armed robbery.
Never mind the total unreality and absurdity of
such a punishment; and never mind the fact that
armed robberies in Dallas remain as frequent as
ever. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the life imprisonment sentence given another Texas defendant after three larcenies which
totalled only two hundred dollars.
One of my favorite examples of the lengths to
which we will go under the rubric of "law and
order" is the Justice Department's strong insistence
on its practice of engaging in what it euphemistically calls "consensual monitoring." Consensual
monitoring is the curious label for a practice in
which one party to a conversation consents to
recording of the conservation without the other
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party's knowledge. Such a practice is about as
consensual as obtaining the perpetrator's consent
to a rape. One other example of "law and order"
procedures is the push for preventive detention in
Illinois and elsewhere. Certain individuals-for example, in the District of Columbia, those charged
with "dangerous crimes" who are found to be
unsafe in the community-may be held in jail
pending trial despite the criminal justice system's
ostensible presumption of their innocence.
These unfortunate devices result from our failure
to make the criminal justice system work. We are
not a cruel people by nature, history, or religion.
Even the Old Testament adage of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth" is not the vengeful prescription usually imagined. Rather it was a recognition that the loss of an eye constitutes a serious
deprivation which the criminal justice system
should seek to remedy.
This familiar adage illustrates a glaring omission
from the legal equation necessary to "establish
justice, promote domestic tranquility, [and] provide for the common defence": consideration of the
victim. It would seem that the victim would head
the list of priorities in our formula for justice. After
all, the victim is the one who was shot, beat up,
raped, robbed, burglarized, or perhaps killed, leaving a shattered family to try to pick up the pieces.
The victim is the one who has to pay the hospital
and doctor bills while missing work, and who may
suffer serious psychological as well as physical pain.
We created our elaborate and expensive criminal
justice system to protect the victim. Some form of
restitution or compensation would seem to be in
order to render the victim whole again. Compensating for loss of life may be impossible, but that
impossibility should not absolve the transgressor
from any responsibility whatsoever for the damage
he has caused.
Unfortunately, the criminal justice system victimizes the victims once again. At most, it seeks
their assistance in apprehending the wrongdoer,
often by forcing them to appear in court to testifysometimes in fear for their lives and well-being,
almost always with great callousness, inconvenience, and expense. The criminal justice system
seems indifferent to whether the victim lost employment, whether the wage-earner has been killed,
or whether there has been an outlay of funds for
medical bills. Horror stories abound regarding the
added humiliation which some rape victims suffer
as details of their past sexual conduct are aired in
a public trial.
The system is simply programmed to run criminals through a process which puts them in jail and,
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according to a formula, lets them out after a certain
period of time with the expectation that they will
be more responsible and productive citizens. In
short, the system juggles notions of deterrence,
vengeance, protection, and rehabilitation in an
effort to arrive at a just result, but rarely, almost
never, does it require the offender to compensate
the victim for his losses.
So we are left with a victim whose contact with
the criminal justice system adds insult to injury. It
is no wonder that such callous treatment engenders
bitterness and hostility from the victims and undermines the administration of justice. Worse yet,
such treatment feeds the frustration of the average
citizen and increases the likelihood that he will
endorse demagogic solutions to crime. Perhaps,
then, instead of sending a criminal to jail and
ignoring him and the victim, we should seriously
consider release programs and alternatives to sentencing which will allow the offender to earn
enough money to recompense the victim.
All our efforts, however, seem to be proceeding
in the opposite direction. The federal and state
governments have largely scrapped prison industries, which could provide offenders with opportunities to learn skills and to compensate victims.
Offended by what many persons considered to be
exploitation of a captive labor force, Congress effectively abolished prison industries by passing a
law preventing goods produced in prisons from
traveling in interstate commerce. Consequently,
the skills acquired in prison, such as producing
license plates, are virtually worthless outside the
prison setting.
Just as state and federal governments have abolished prison industries, so too has Congress failed
to provide restitution to the victims of crime. To a
large extent this failure reflects the differing perspectives of the drafters of restitution legislation
and interest groups.
In one such instance, while the drafters of restitution legislation were concerned about street
crime and about citizens being victimized by
armed youths, an interest group, the Business
Roundtable, focused on antitrust, pollution, and
environmental concerns. The Roundtable's concerns are important but they could be addressed
by excluding white collar crime from restitution
legislation. Such an approach is viable because in
white collar cases the victim is capable of finding
another forum in which to obtain restitution,
rather than using the criminal justice system.
Even if support for restitution develops and
judges increasingly require offenders to recompense

their victims, there will remain a sizeable class of
crime victims who will not benefit. Restitution is
not applicable when the offender is not apprehended and found guilty. If the offender is shot by
the police and dies penniless, restitution is unavailable. These same problems foreclose recovery
by the victim in any kind of civil lawsuit against
the offender.
There is a need for a compensation program
which operates regardless of whether the criminal
is caught or has financial resources. As I have
indicated, one of the primary reasons that individuals joined together in society was for mutual aid
and protection. Americans pay their tax dollars
expecting to be protected. In mutually sharing the
cost of crime control measures, we have given up
certain rights to self-help and shifted the responsibility for our safety to the Government. When a
citizen suffers the misfortune of victimization by a
criminal act, the Government has failed that citizen. The least the Government ought to do when
its protection fails, is to provide some type of
insurance policy. It is unjust and inequitable to
make a small minority of unfortunate citizens bear
the costs of crime.
This idea is hardly novel. Almost 4,000 years
ago, under Hammurabi's Babylonian Code,
wrongdoers were required to compense their victims:
[I]f the robber is not caught, the man who has been
robbed shall formally declare whatever he has lost
before a god, and the city and the mayor in whose
territory or district the robbery has been committed
shall replace whatever he has lost for him. If [it is]
the life [of the owner that is lost], the city or the
mayor shall pay one manch of silver to his kinfolk.
Until the decline of the silver market, a "manch"
was a pretty fair settlement.
In the late 1950s, Margery Fry, a British social
reformer, drew attention to the lack of such a
compensation program in a letter to the London
Observer. What prompted the letter was her outrage
at a court's restitution order which would have
fully indemnified the victim only if he lived for
another 442 years. She maintained that "the State
which forbids our going armed in self-defense cannot disown all responsibility for its occasional failure to protect." In response, the British government
established a program for public compensation of
victims.of crime.
In recent years, similar programs have been
adopted by other countries and by half of the states
(including Illinois) in this country. But the state
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programs are very modest and little noticed. Victims are eligible only for unreimbursed losses from
personal injuries sustained in a crime of violence.
Overall, it is estimated that less than two percent
of violent crime victims actually receive compensation. Obviously, federal contributions for programs compensating victims of crime would extend
their reach and impact. Congress, however, has
failed to act.
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We need some programs that can restore faith
in the criminal justice system. We need to believe
that lawyers, and courts, and the law are our institutions, and that they work for all of us. Ignatius
Silone said that "[o]n a group of theories, one can
found a school, but on a group of values one can
found a culture, a civilization, a new way of living
together among men." That is the task before usto restore our values.

